




On July 30, 1984, the Brazilian Government announced a proposed national
computer law that would regulate imports of computer-related goods and
services until 1990.' The move sparked instant controversy with loud protests
from multinational computer producers.2 On September 7, 1984, Clayton
Yeutter. the United States Trade Representative (USTR), announced the filing of
an investigation of Brazil's informatics policy under section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974.3 This investigation was one of the first to be self-initiated by the
USTR.4 This comment analyzes the progress of that case and the pattern it
establishes for future U.S. actions in trade disputes with developing nations.
I. Brazil's Economic Stance and Trade
Relationship with the United States
In the late sixties, Brazil began a period of economic development. 5 The
Brazilian economy was stimulated through large government construction
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projects, general industrialization, and modernization of the consumer durables
industry. Brazil accomplished this through the importation of technology,
sending students abroad for graduate study, public support for university
research, and establishment of research and development laboratories in major
state-owned companies. 6 The Brazilian Government also acted to substitute
imports with domestic products and increase exports of manufactured goods.
Using a system of incentives for production and export, Brazil enjoyed success
in several areas, most notably the aircraft manufacturing industry.
7
After a recession in the early 1980s, Brazil entered a period of economic
growth. 8 Despite triple-digit inflation, the gross domestic product showed real
growth of 5 percent to 8 percent per year from 1984 to 1986. 9 During the same
period, Brazil showed an average positive trade balance of U.S. $11 million per
year. to Brazil also has one of the largest gross national products for developing
nations.'" The United States is Brazil's largest trading partner, accounting for
23 percent of Brazil's export sales and providing 16 percent of nonoil
imports. 12
Despite showing real economic growth and a positive trade balance, the
Brazilian economy is beset with numerous problems. Brazil carries a foreign
debt of about $112 billion.' 3 At present Brazil has reached a shaky accord with
her international creditors providing for repayment of the foreign bank debt over
a twenty-year period. 14 Compounding the problem are foreign banks that have
become increasingly leery of lending to heavily indebted developing nations. '5
This attitude tightens the supply of capital available for new ventures.
Brazil, like many developing nations, also faces inflation and unemployment
problems. Inflation in 1987 was 366 percent.' 6 The 1988 levels could top the
1987 rate.' 7 Unemployment, which was 25 percent in 1984 and increased in
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1987, will continue to be a problem. 18 A decline in domestic purchasing power,
weak foreign and domestic investment, and high interest rates are predicted as a
result of current inflation levels and high unemployment. 19
Brazil restricts imports through a licensing system administered by the Foreign
Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil. 2') The imports are restricted by a
number of regulations collectively known as the "Law of Similars." 2 1 In
essence, the Law of Similars restricts importation when similar domestically
produced goods are available. State-owned entities, which predominate the
industrial ecomony, face special restrictions and may only purchase imports if
the price of the national similar is at least 15 percent higher than the import.
22
Brazil's informatics policy, governing both imports and domestic production, is
consistent with the general philosophy of the Law of Similars.
The Law of Similars is not, strictly speaking, inconsistent with article I of the
GATT. Given that the aim of the GATT is to promote fair trade based on
principles of nondiscrimination, however, the Law of Similars is in conflict with
that aim. Additionally, article 24 of the GATT provides for special concessions
to developing nations in an attempt to allow them to develop economic
equality. 23 Thus, an argument can be made that the Law of Similars is fair under
article 24 in that the Law of Similars is merely an attempt by Brazil to protect
domestic industry until it can develop to the point of international competitive-
ness.
A. BRAZIL'S INFORMATICS MARKET
Informatics activities are those connected with the rational and automatic
processing of information. Such activities include research, development,
production, import. export, and marketing of computers, electronic components,
software, and other digital technology-based devices including telecommunica-
tions equipment, process control equipment, and electronic instruments, and
corresponding technology information services.24
In the early seventies, Brazil attempted to develop a microcomputer industry.
Foreign firms were to provide the technology while state and Brazilian private
sector resources would combine to provide the capital and marketing expertise.
25
This is the same system that worked so well in the creation of an aircraft
manufacturing industry.26 Nevertheless, attempts to create joint ventures with
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foreign firms were largely unsuccessful in the microcomputer industry. Most
foreign manufacturers, including all the major U.S. manufacturers, refused to
participate in the program because the royalties and length of contracts were
restricted by Brazil's Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Code.27
Only one manufacturing operation was started and it was stifled by poor product
decisions and financial and managerial problems.2 s
Despite the inability of the Government to create a domestic computer
product, the data processing industry continued to grow rapidly in the early
seventies. Large government purchases expanded the market at a rate 50 percent
greater than the world market. 29 In 1974, the market was valued at $700
million.
30
In 1976, computers and related products were Brazil's third largest import.
3 1
From 1979 to 1985, the adjusted gross sales of U.S. firms in Brazil nearly
doubled from $533 million to $1 billion. 32 Despite the recessionary economic
climate through 1984, the Brazilian informatics market grew 125 percent
between 1981 and 1985. 3 3 In 1986, the domestic market was estimated to be
$2.7 billion, $2 billion more than the market in 1974. 34
In 1986, 270 Brazilian firms controlled 55 percent of the market. 35 The
domestic industry employed 20,000 people. 36 The U.S. Department of
Commerce estimates that Brazilian restrictions on informatics imports and
investment result in losses to U.S. firms of between $337 million and $452
million per year. 37 In 1985, the same year the U.S. investigation was initiated,
domestic companies operating in Brazil exported $11 million worth of
equipment. 8 It seems premature to contend that Brazil is controlling the export
market when domestically owned firms account for only 5 percent of the total
export market.
B. BRAZIL'S INFORMATICS POLICY
In 1972, Brazil established the Commission for the Coordination of Electron-
ics Activities (CAPRE). 39 The purpose of CAPRE was to coordinate federal
27. Botelho. supra note 2, at 39.
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data-processing activities and purchases. 40 The Commission was regarded as
necessary because of the large volume of government purchases of data
processing equipment. The drain in Brazil's foreign exchange reserves, caused
by the first oil crisis, prompted the government to give CAPRE the additional
task of formulating an industrial policy for informatics. 4 1 This decision put the
creation of a domestic informatics manufacturing industry in CAPRE's hands
and included some power over the importation of the parts and components
required by data-processing systems.
42
CAPRE responded quickly by imposing quotas on data-processing equipment
imports. In June of 1976, with the backing of the National Bank for Economic
Development, CAPRE came forth with a master plan to develop a Brazilian
computer manufacturing industry.43 Basically, the policy was to reserve to
domestic industry the production of minicomputers, microcomputers, and
peripheral devices wherever feasible. 4 The plan was implemented by encour-
aging the licensing of foreign technology by domestic manufacturers.4 5 The
present informatics policy is a continuation of this same basic philosophy.
In early 1977, the Council of Economic Development promulgated criteria for
approval of new computer manufacturing ventures. The criteria examined were:
(1) the national content of any equipment produced; (2) the export potential of
the company; (3) total access to technology by Brazilian partners; (4) the market
shares of the participating companies; and (5) the degree of control of the capital
of the company by Brazilian nationals.46 French, German, and Japanese firms
participated in the program although the licensing period was limited to a
nonrenewable five-year term and royalties were restricted to 5 percent of net.
sales. 47 U.S. firms considered the restrictions too harsh and did not participate.
In 1979, CAPRE was replaced by the Special Secretariat of Informatics (SEI).
SEI continued CAPRE's policy objectives but greatly expanded their scope to
encompass micro-electronics, telematics, and real-time control systems. 4 8 SEI's
general mandate was to, "provide assistance in establishing the Brazilian
informatics industry and to coordinate the implementation of such policy in the
capacity of a superior policy, planning, supervision and control agency." 49 More
40. Decree No. 70.370. Apr. 5, 1972, art. I. At the time CAPRE's duties were restricted to
making an investigation of the private and govemnent computer park, and to give an opinion on the
purchase and lease of computer equipment by government agencies and entities.
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importantly, SEI mandated protection of the domestic industry's market until
such time as international competition would be considered possible. 50 Thus, the
domestic market was to be reserved to the infant Brazilian producers, thereby
nourishing these producers until they had become sufficiently advanced to export
their products competitively.
By 1982, the program was considered a success in Brazil. Foreign affiliates
were participating in the program and the local industry's market share was
growing. 5' The number of Brazilian microcomputer manufacturers grew from
two in 1979 to thirty-three by 1984.52 These firms stayed on top of the rapid
technological developments and in at least one instance were able to produce an
IBM PC-AT compatible that ran faster than the original. Prices, although initially
high, had fallen by 1984 until they were lower in some instances than their
foreign counterparts.5 3 In the microcomputer sector of the market, Brazil's
informatics policy obviously achieved its goal of creating a domestic industry.
Unlike the microcomputer sector, the minicomputer and mainframe markets
did not fare as well. Brazil's rapidly expanding market attracted large American
firms, who soon began cutting into the domestic market share. In 1984, IBM
(U.S.) controlled 70 percent of the $881 million mainframe market and with the
entry of American producers the domestic minicomputer producers lost 30
percent of the market share between 1982 and 1984.54 By 1984, Brazilian firms
were calling for more protection as their market share began to decrease due to
the entry of American manufacturers in the rapidly expanding market. The
Brazilian Government responded with the Informatics Law of 1984.
II. Informatics Law of 1984
In essence, the Informatics Law of 198455 perpetuated the philosophy of SEI's
earlier plan but further restricted domestic affiliations with multinational com-
panies. In Brazil the prediction was that the 1984 Law would not lead to
commercial retaliation from either the affected multinationals or their govern-
ments. General Danilo Venturini, head of the National Security Council, which
has authority over SEI, said, "[t]hese methods of protection and government
assistance to the national computer industry are perfectly compatible with
obligations resulting from treaties or agreements to which Brazil is a party.''56
The magnitude of this misconception will become apparent below.
50. Seidman. supra note 36.
51. Id.
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Initially, two proposals were brought to the Brazilian Congress for
consideration. Senator Roberto Campos sponsored the less restrictive proposal
that was supported by many manufacturers who felt their competitiveness was
threatened by inability to obtain current computer technology. Senator
Campos's proposal would eliminate the market reserve policy. Instead, the
Brazilian market would be opened and major incentives would be given to
foreign firms to produce in Brazil. The incentives would be tied to the
requirement that a portion of the foreign firm's domestic production be
exported. Campos's primary reason for eliminating the market reserve policy
was the high prices paid by the domestic consumers for the locally produced
goods.
Zazi Correa Da Costa, however, speaking for SEI, said. "[t]here's not really
any intention of liberalizing . . . the intention is to acquire capacity not only in
producing, but in developing technology." 58 She stated that under the new law
the micro- and minicomputer markets would be reserved for domestic firms,
while the mainframe market would be left open. U.S. firms in Brazil were
critical of the proposal.
The proposed legislation was strongly supported by domestic industry. The
pervasive feeling was that domestic producers needed protection in their infancy
from the large Japanese and American firms in order for the domestic industry to
develop. Edson Fregni, president of a Brazilian microcomputer manufacturer.
said:
In the computer field today in Brazil. the process of technological development is not
up to date. It is behind foreign firms. For capitalists in Brazil, as well as foreigners, to
invest in a certain sector, they need assurances of return. We need a law that will give
us a more stable environment, maintained for a longer period, to justify the investment
of Brazilian capitalists.- 9
The supporters of the restrictive market reserve provisions felt the provisions
were essential if domestic industry was to attract the needed capital.
A compromise proposal backed by domestic banking groups would allow
foreign production in Brazil for export only, reserving the domestic market for
Brazilian firms. The banking group, the U.S. firms and the Campos supporters
all felt that the market reserve plan was unrealistic simply because Brazil did not
have the capital necessary to fund the domestic industry. 60 In the end, however,
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B. PROVISIONS
The 1984 Informatics Law established a new administrative body to control
the Brazilian informatics industry and market: The National Council of Infor-
matics Industry and Market. The National Council of Informatics and Automa-
tion (CONIN) now has authority over SEI. 6' CONIN, which is under
civilian control, operates at the cabinet level and is directly responsible to the
President of Brazil.62 The Law requires that CONIN submit a National Plan for
Informatics (PLANIN) every third year to the National Congress. 63 CONIN is
now responsible for establishing the informatics policy within the legal frame-
work provided by the 1984 Informatics Law.
The Law adopted restrictions on production, operation, marketing, sale, and
importation of goods and services in the informatics industry.64 These temporary
restrictions may be imposed by the government at any time.65 The intent is that
they will remain in force until the national companies are consolidated and are
competitive in the international market. 66 Specifically, the markets for minicom-
puters and microcomputers are reserved to national firms. 67 This market is to be
reserved for seven years until 1992.68 The 1984 Informatics Law thus insures
national firms a monopoly in the mini- and microcomputer markets for a period
thought to be sufficient for them to obtain a competitive status.
Under the Law a "national" firm is one in which control of decision,
technology, and capital is "permanently, exclusively and unconditionally," in
the hands of Brazilian nationals or domestic public entities. 69 The firm must be
autonomous in the sense that its external sources of technology and capital do not
have the real or potential ability to wrest control of the firm from the Brazilian
nationals. 70 One hundred percent of voting capital must be controlled by
Brazilian nationals. 7 1 Control of technology must extend to development,
acquisition, transfer, and modification.7 2 Perhaps most importantly the most that
61. Seidman. supra note 36, at 61.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Doing Business in Brazil, supra note 46. § 22.106.
65. Id.
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69. Doing Business in Brazil, supra note 46, § 22.107. Control was defined to mean:
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operation of administrative bodies: 11. Technological control-the power to develop, generate,
acquire, transfer and alter product and production process technology: and I11. Capital control-the
direct or indirect ownership of all the capital having actual or potential voting rights and at least 70
percent of the capital stock. Id.
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71. Turner, PABX Suppliers Quitting Brazil, ELECrRONICS WEEK, Dec. 17, 1984, at 40.
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a foreign firm can control is 30 percent of the nonvoting capital.73 Joint ventures,
as a practical matter, are prohibited by the definition of national firms.
Foreign firms, those that do not meet the criteria of a "national" firm, are
prohibited from domestic production in markets where national firms have actual
or potential production capability.74 If the technical capacity does not exist in a
particular market, a joint venture may be approved by SEI. 75 This is an exception
to the general rule. It means that the mainframe market will remain open to
foreign firms because Brazil does not have the technology or capital to enter this
market at present.
The Law provides several major financial incentives for domestic firms.
Imports and industrial products brought in by the national firms for research and
development projects may be up to 100 percent tax exempt, provided the
components are not produced domestically. 76 The same is true of imports
brought in for the production of goods and informatics services for the national
firms. The national firms also enjoy exemption from export taxes, which should
make their products less expensive and, thus, more competitive in the world
market. In addition, the firms may receive a reduction or exemption from various
domestic taxes.77
In addition to tax incentives, the law provides for a line of fiscal incentives to
encourage the purchase of shares of the domestic firms.78 Investors may receive
tax deductions up to the purchase price of the shares. 7 9 National firms also
receive priority in obtaining government procurement contracts. 80 These incen-
tives seek to make attractive an investment in the emerging Brazilian production
industry.
The 1984 Law also attempts to entice foreign companies to base their
production facilities in Brazil and thereby increase export earnings. Foreign
companies can manufacture equipment in the informatics export districts,
located in the north and northeast regions of Brazil, provided that production is
exclusively for export. 8 ' These foreign firms do not enjoy many of the tax
benefits granted to the domestic firms.
The Law also provides that foreign firms that sell in Brazil must disclose the
technical information necessary to allow the interconnection of their products
with products produced by other firms.8 2 Because of Brazil's lack of copyright
protection, foreign producers are not likely to be eager to make such disclosures.
73. Turner. supra note 71, at 40.
74. Brazilian Inforniatics-Background, supra note 24.
75. Id. at 65 n.247.
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The 1984 Law is unclear, however, as to the amount of disclosure required; thus
there may be room for negotiation on this point.83
III. Foreign Response
Despite General Venturini's optimistic predictions, 84 the 1984 Informatics
Law quickly gave rise to negative responses from several sources. Almost
immediately, several large multinational corporations pulled out of joint ventures
in Brazil, their positions made untenable by the 1984 Law. Within a year,
President Reagan initiated an investigation of Brazil's informatics policy under
section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974. The repercussions of President
Reagan's and Brazil's actions are discussed below.
Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President may impose duties
or other import restrictions in response to unfair trade practices by foreign
nations.85 In addition, he may take any other "appropriate and feasible action
within his power." 86 Actionable practices under section 301 include any act or
practice of a foreign government that either: (I ) deny benefits to the United States
under a trade agreement; or (2) are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory
and pose a burden on U.S. commerce.87 GATT is included as a trade agreement
under this section.8 8 "Unjustifiable" and "unreasonable" are defined under the
statute to include the denial of the right to establish an enterprise in a foreign
country. 89 The definitions of "unjustifiable" and "unreasonable" also include
the denial of protection of intellectual property rights. 90 The Brazilian Informat-
ics Law of 1984, which prohibited imports of certain American computer
products into Brazil, was deemed actionable by the President in that it was
"unreasonable" under the provisions of section 301.9'
Investigations may be initiated in three ways under section 301: (1) by the
President on his own motion; (2) by the USTR on the USTR's own motion; or
(3) by the USTR in response to a petition by an interested party.92 From a
substantive standpoint it makes little difference who initiates the action. When a
petition from an interested party is received, the USTR must decide within
83. Id.
84. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (19X2 & Supp. Il1 1985).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 2411 (e)(3)-(5) (Supp. 1985). See generallyv Bello & Holner. U.S. Trade Law and
Policy Series #10: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Uifair Trade Cases. 21 IN't
LAW. 211 (1987).
88. See Bello & Homer. supra note 87, at 212 n.3.
89. 19 U.S.C. § 241 I(e)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Brazil to Consider Reotlitotzv Measures Following U.S. Announcement of 'Sanctions. 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) 1419. 1419 (1987): see infra text accompanying note 130.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a). (c).
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forty-five days whether or not to initiate an investigation.' 3 Once an investigation
is initiated, by any one of the available methods, section 301 calls for
consultations with the offending foreign government. The Trade Act of 1974
imposes deadlines by which the USTR must recommend to the President what
action he should take.9 4
Under section 301 the President has discretion to decide if the practice is
actionable and if so what type of relief should be provided.95 The President must
publish his determination and the reasons for it. 96 The act is the primary instrument
of the United States in seeking more open access to foreign markets. 97 During the
first eleven years of its existence the act was used sparingly; only forty-eight
investigations were conducted, all in response to petitions by interested persons.9X
In 1985. the Administration, committed to a more vigorous pursuit of fair trade,
self-initiated section 301 action for the first time.99 The Brazil informatics case
was among the first to be self-initiated by the President. to
The action was initiated by the USTR in September 1985 at the direction of
President Reagan. By April of 1986, USTR Clayton Yeutter reported that no
progress had been made in bilateral meetings with Brazil. ""' In May, the White
House announced that retaliation against Brazil was under consideration. 102 The
list of Brazilian imports for possible retaliatory sanctions included footwear,
steel, aircraft, and agricultural products. While Brazil protested that the new
government under President Sarney had not been given time to formulate a new
policy, the USTR claimed that Brazil had categorically denied all U.S.
obligations. At that point the United States Government estimated that U.S.
companies had lost $1.5 billion in sales. 1 3
The United States and Brazil continued to negotiate. In July 1986, the
governments reported "that they had found common ground which offered real
possibilities for achieving progress, but no agreement on the section 301
complaint appears to be in sight." ' (" The situation remained tense, however,
93. /d. § 2412(a).
94. /1/. § 2414(a)( I)
95. Il. § 2411 (c)(2 .
96. I. The Brazilian Informatics determination is published as Memorandum of Oct. 6. 1986.
for the United States Trade Representative. Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974. 51 Fed. Reg. 35.995 (1986).
97. Bello & Holmer. stra note 87. at 215.
98. Id.
99. President to Aourne Clearer Trade Polo y Stanc Depetndent .n Openbog Marke.s Abroad.
2 Int'l Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (BNA) I 10) (1985).
100. /i.
101. Bium Ass'erts Int'rnatiol Trading Systel Mist Either Be InPro'ed or RePha'ed. 3 Int'l
Trade Rcp.-Curreit Rep. (BNA) 521 (1986).
102. 'hite Hous' (oouil Agrees to PI'rsoe 3101 Cornphnt with Brazil Over Infornotaics. 3 tnt'
Trade Rep.- Current Rep. (IINA) 685 1)986).
103. Id.
104. Korean § 30/ Intellecttuul Property. Inisurate ( ases Near Resolttion. No Bra:ilian Deal
Seen. 3 Intl Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (BNA) 890. 890 (1986).
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with the U.S. Administration accusing Brazil of "stonewalling." "15 The United
States continued to threaten that sanctions would be forthcoming if progress was
not made.11 6 A September 16th deadline was set for making a determination in
the case.11
7
Talks held in August and a meeting held in early September between Brazil's
President Sarney and President Reagan failed to be fruitful in reaching a
compromise. The deadline for determination in the case was extended to October
6th."' On that date, the President released a determination under section 301
that Brazil's informatics acts, policies, and practices posed an unreasonable
burden on U.S. commerce."' 9 Due to pending elections in Brazil, the Admin-
istration forestalled any major action against Brazil. The United States did,
however, notify the GATT of its intention to suspend tariff concessions on some
Brazilian products.""
On December 9th, Brazil reacted by proposing a new software protection law
as a gesture of "good will.'..'. The proposed law relaxed the technology control
requirements of the 1984 Law and provided for copyright protection of
twenty-five years, with fines and jail sentences of up to two years for
violations.'' 2 On December 18, 1986, the White House notified Brazil that the
December 31st deadline for action had been extended to July I, 1987. 13 Brazil
Foreign Relations Minister, Abreu Sodre, said retaliation was no longer being
considered in the negotiations and that the two nations had reached an
understanding on the substantive issues in dispute.'14
In a March 1987 hearing the USTR listened to U.S. computer industry
officials who urged that Brazil's policies were still unfairly restrictive and action
should be taken. 115 Oliver R. Smoot of the Computer and Business Equipment
Manufacturers Association argued that even though the law permits up to 30
percent foreign equity investment, in practice no investment is possible because
the law requires complete relinquishment of technology control. Smoot charged
105. Id. at 891
106. U.S.. Korea Settle Intellectuial Propert, Isuran'e Ca.ses. Alore Tu/ks Set iti/h Bra-il. 3 Int'l
Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (BNA) 937 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Sartev Sa.s Bra-il Taking Steps to Reettir Trade Iotba/ance. But Debt Problems Remai,. 3
Int'l Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (3NA) 1125. 1125 (1986).
109. Memorandunt of Oct. 6. 1986. lor" the United States Trade Representative. Detcrmination
Under Section 301 of" the Trade Act of 1974. 51 Fed. Reg. 35.995 (1986).
110. U.S. Settles "abac' Di.pule 'ith Japan, No Deal Seeii lith Brazil on Ifrinati.s. 3 Inl
Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (BNA) 1215. 1215 (1986).
II I. Brazil Prto:PiePose asNeStharoeiiii in t apes,[i o Resoing U.S. haticRsCii.i 3 It'
Trade Rep.-Current Rep. (BNA) 1495 (1986).
112. /i.
113. U.S. hniorsin. Brazil that Action De/aved Until Jitld / on Infiu 'natic's Displute. 3 Int'l Trade
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that although negotiations to this point had obtained a list of products that Brazil
would allow to be imported, that list did not contain 'products in the mainstream
of our industry."' 16 Smoot also complained that the proposed software law was
inadequate in that it was unclear, left SEI officials with too much room for
interpretation, and in effect extended the Brazilian market reserve to software
with indirect forms of compulsory licensing. 17 Other industry leaders testified
that Brazil was also being hurt by the informatics policy because of higher
consumer prices, lost foreign investment capital, and slipping rank in the global
industry. They also testified that the lack of adequate copyright protection hurt
both the United States, through lost revenues, and Brazil. through lost invest-
ments. The consensus among industry representatives was that the proposed
software regulation did not solve the major problems of the 1984 Informatics
Law and that although Brazil had the right to impose commercial regulations it
should not be allowed to restrict world trade unduly. '"
On June 29. 1987, sources in the Reagan Administration predicted the
Administration would again extend the deadline in the Brazil informatics case. '19
Industry leaders indicated that Brazil appeared to be moving its software
protection laws toward conformity with international norms. In addition, signs of
progress in the area of foreign investment were viewed as positive. '2( Vico E.
Henriques. president of the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers
Association. said. "It would be unwise of the U.S. to allow an arbitrary deadline
to force retaliation just as we're about to make significant gains in software
protection." 121 On June 30. 1987, President Reagan suspended indefinitely the
intellectual property portion of the section 301 investigation. 22 President
Reagan directed the USTR to continue the foreign investment portion of the
investigation "as appropriate." however. 23
The Administration's refusal to impose sanctions was strongly criticized by
members of the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee. Representative
James Florio said that the enactment of market-opening legislation was imper-
ative. "'At stake." he said. "'is nothing less than the right of U.S. patent and
copyright holders to benefit from the technology they create." 24 On October 13.
1987, however, despite the subcommittee's negative comments and new allega-
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tions of software piracy involving Apple's Macintosh and Microsoft's MS-DOS
system, the cabinet level Economic Policy Council postponed a decision on
whether to reopen the intellectual property portion of the investigation. 125
At the same time. Brazil acknowledged that a new crisis was emerging
because of SEI's refusal to approve distribution of the MS-DOS software in
Brazil. 121 SEI refused to allow distribution because it claimed that a Brazilian
substitute was available. ' 27 Francisco Ranalho. president of the Brazilian
Informatic Services Companies' Association, said that rather than overreact to
SEI's decision the United States should lobby for changes in the new software
law that was still pending before the Brazilian Senate. 2"1 Although SEI oflicials
said that retaliation by the United States would be "totally absurd." four
Brazilian computer companies announced that they would appeal to CONIN to
overturn SEI's decision. Sodre. Brazil's Foreign Affairs Minister, called for
further negotiation to overcome the crisis. He said. -The Brazilian point of view
is stated on the informatics law. which is in the interest of our country .... We
should negotiate with the U.S., defending our sovcreignty.''12"
On November 13, 1987. President Reagan announced that tariffs totaling $105
million would be placed on Brazilian imports because Brazil was not keeping the
commitments it made to cooperate. 13o In response. Brazilian President Jose
Sarney ordered an immediate study of U.S. imports that could be targeted for
counter-retaliation. 131 Sarney called the White House action, ''an undue and
discriminating threat. 1 32 In the United States the Administration's actions were
applauded by both Congress 33 and U.S. industry. 134 The Brazilian attitude was
that the sanctions would probably not become reality because CONIN was likely
to overturn the SEI decision that had sparked the Administration's move. There
was, however, strong support for the imposition of counter-retaliatory measures
should the U.S. sanctions go into effect. 35
Brazil also complained to the GATT that the imposition of' sanctions by the
United States would be a violation of GATT rules. 136 Brazil called for article
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XXIII consultations, which provide for bilateral negotiations to resolve a dispute
on or prior to a decision by a GATT panel. 137 "We cannot accept a claim by the
United States to have a right to resort to unilateral actions, based on domestic
lecislation. without due regard to GATT rules and in breach of commitments
assumed." said Brazilian delegate Jose Alfredo Graca Lima.' 38 United States
delegate Charles Blum replied. "Ithe Brazilian informatics policyl is clearly
unfair, and since bilateral consultations have failed, we have been barred from a
market. We are not prepared to accept this." ''
39
In view of the United States' threatened retaliations President Sarney vetoed a
200 percent fee on foreign software contained in the new software law. "
Unhappy Brazilian industrial leaders vowed to overturn the veto in Congress.",
Although the United States continued to move toward sanctions. Brazilian
leaders were hopeful that passage of the new software legislation and an expected
reversal of SEI's .MS-DOS decision would lead to a new round of
negotiations. 142
On January 20. 1988. CONIN overturned SEI's decision and authorized the
licensingz of Microsoft's MS-DOS 3.3 operating system. -3 The decision
prompted Brazilian business executives to send a letter to the USTR calling for
an end to the United States' sanction threat. Proceeding with sanctions now they
said. "would be throwing a nuclear bomb after having won the war." 4' The
Brazilian group also pledged to monitor the regulations that would be promul-
gated under the software law. 145 On March 1, 1988. USTR Clayton Yeutter
announced that the Administration would forestall the proposed sanctions until
the regulations implementing the new Brazilian software law could be studied. .,
Thus, at the time of this writing, although the section 301 case has not been
resolved it is currently on hold for an indefinite period.
IV. The Utility of Section 301 as a Negotiation Tool
After more than two years of investigation the Administration's section 301
case against Brazil seems no closer to resolution than the day it started. Progress
has been made by the two countries in the informatics dispute. however, and the
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section 301 action may well have been a necessary part of that progress. The
Administration moved quickly in ascertaining that Brazil's acts, practices, and
policies in informatics following the passage of the 1984 Informatics Law were
actionable under section 301.147 This quick determination forced Brazil to the
negotiating table-a step Brazil had previously avoided taking.
Initially, Brazilian leaders refused to take the threat of section 301 action
seriously, perhaps justifiably so given the paltry number of investigations
previously conducted under that section. Once the United States took the step of
actually determining Brazil's Law objectionable under the statute, however,
Brazilian negotiators began to take notice. Subsequent to determining that
Brazil's conduct was actionable, the Administration has proceeded with caution.
There was no rush to impose sanctions on Brazil despite the protests from some
sections of Congress and U.S. industry leaders. Instead, the threat of impending
sanctions has been effectively used by the Administration to force Brazil to come
to the bargaining table with serious, workable proposals.
In the numerous bilateral talks that have taken place as a result of the section
301 action, the United States has made real progress in moderating Brazil's
restrictive stance. Large gains have been made in insuring the protection of U.S.
industries' intellectual property. The enactment of the new software legislation
by Brazil has the possibility of effectively protecting American interests if it is
implemented as Brazil has indicated it will be. In addition the threat of sanctions
was effective in overturning SEI's decision concerning the Microsoft software.
That reversal could open the door for the entry of more American software.
Although little progress has been made in allowing foreign investment in Brazil.
on the whole the Administration has been effective thus far in utilizing section
301 as a powerful tool to open the closed Brazilian markets.
The ultimate question remains unresolved; that is, how much freedom should
Brazil, as a developing nation, have to regulate imports into what it considers a
developing market? Current international agreements have recognized the rights
of developing nations to subsidize and restrict access to infant markets in order
to promote the growth of domestic infant industries. That type of protection has
not been allowed to the extent that it causes undue harm to other nations,
however. 148 Brazil's position is that its informatics industry is still in the
developmental stages and should have the right to restrict access to the market in
order to allow the industry to mature.
In the realm of intellectual property the answer seems straightforward. Brazil
has the right to place tariffs on the imported software processes, as any import
may be taxed. That right should not extend to the point that a licensing process
that in effect entails a relinquishment of any control over the technology is a
147. See White House Council Agrees to Pursue 301 Complaint with Brazil over Informatics,
supra note 102. and accompanying text.
148. See Bello and Holmer. supra note 87. at 216.
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mandatory prerequisite to importation. To the extent that Brazilian law forces the
disclosure of technological secrets or fails to protect intellectual property so that
they are easily pirated it should be curtailed. Otherwise, the Brazilian law
expropriates for its domestic industry the legitimate work product of foreign
companies without giving just compensation in return. The advances made
through the section 301 investigation, if implemented under the new software
law, should effectively alleviate this problem.
The question of Brazil's right to stipulate levels of foreign ownership, institute
domestic component requirements, or completely reserve domestic markets is
more problematic. The U.S. position is that as the sixth or seventh largest market
in the world the Brazilian industry cannot be considered an infant one. 149 Perhaps
this is a mischaracterization on the part of the United States because, regardless
of the size of the market, Brazil's own industry may not be sufficiently mature
to compete within it. Market size is not determinative of a domestic industry's
maturity. For instance in the mainframe sector of the market, which is worth
$800 million, the Brazilian industry has yet to be born. '5 Conversely, the
Brazilian microcomputer market has progressed to the point at which it can
successfully compete with foreign multinationals, in some cases actually
undercutting their prices or providing better technology. 15 1 Given these facts
there seem to be some inconsistencies in Brazil's rationale for her informatics
policy. The current Brazilian Law closes the market in some sectors where Brazil
has demonstrated an ability to compete. while leaving the market open to
foreigners where Brazilian industry is either nonexistent or truly in its formative
stages.
On Brazil's behalf the argument can be made that the question is one of
degree. Although under the protection of the 1984 Informatics Law domestic
manufacturers are able to compete in the international market, they would be
unable to do so if that protection, and consequently the domestic market base,
were removed. Thus, they should be allowed to develop under the continued
protection of that law until they have matured to the point where they can
compete without it.
Where a Brazilian industry truly does not exist, such as in the mainframe
market, a different argument could be postulated. There Brazil must leave the
market open to satisfy its own rapidly increasing technological needs. To do
otherwise would hinder the country's economic development. In so doing,
however, Brazil precludes the development of its own domestic industry. This
conclusion is illustrated by the fact that IBM continues to hold an 80 percent
market share in the mainframe market.
149. U.S. Settles Tobacco Dispute with Japan, No Deal Seen with Brazil on Informatics, supra
note 110. at 1215.
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V. Conclusion
The right of Brazil to foster a growing domestic industry, even if it entails the
use of some protectionistic measures, is undisputed. The problem lies with
Brazil's methodology. The system of incentives for domestic investment,
mandatory domestic control, and market reserve has worked for Brazil in the
past. 152 In the present context it is untenable. Not only is it depriving Brazil of
much needed foreign capital, increasing consumer costs, and restricting access to
foreign technology, but it is also unfairly infringing on other countries' rights of
access to Brazil's informatics market. Just as Brazil has access to the world
market in other areas, she must grant the world access to her informatics market.
Perhaps the answer is to restructure the law to encourage greater foreign capital
participation, further protect foreign technological secrets, and provide export
incentives. At the same time the domestic industry and economy could be
fostered by restricting the removal of dividends and increasing the mandatory
percentage of profits that each company must spend on research and develop-
ment. Control need not be taken from the domestic industries; the foreign
participation requirements need only be relaxed to the point where foreign
participation is feasible.
One thing is clear: In the Brazil informatics case the Administration has been
able to use its powers under section 301 to establish a greater fairness and equity
in the international market. The case, though far from over, has demonstrated the
effectiveness of section 301 as a market opening tool if wielded with caution and
skill. Care must be taken not to implement sanctions rashly, for, as this case has
demonstrated, the mere threat of sanctions can have beneficial results.
152. See genertilly Carl. suprd: note 7.
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